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Since the 2008 financial crises the appointments of technocrats in parliamentary cabinets has 
more than doubled. At the same time most European governments adopted fiscal austerity with 
important consequences for their welfare states. How much of this effect is due to the financial 
crisis and how much is it due to the specific ministerial appointments? Using data from 13 
European countries since 1980 and two-stage least square models, I test the effects of financial 
crises and of technocratic appointments on a battery of social welfare indicators. Initial results 
indicate that technocrats appointed in the finance portfolio have real effects on social welfare 
policy, controlling for financial crises. However, experienced ministers with a background in 
economics are also associated with cuts in social welfare expenditure.  
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How has the Great Recession changed mature welfare states? Against the broad consensus that 
the 2008 financial crisis has deeply changed domestic and international politics (Tooze, 2018), 
there is less consensus about how it has affected the welfare states of industrialized 
democracies. While fiscal austerity was adopted by governments across the board, welfare state 
reforms varied considerably (Kersbergen, Vis, & Hemerijck, 2014). Domestic actors and 
institutions seem to primarily explain this variation. Some scholars find that left governments, 
particularly when they consist of broad coalitions, have implemented the deepest spending cuts 
(Armingeon, Guthmann, & Weisstanner, 2016), while others find that right of center 
governments, particularly in liberal and minimal welfare states, have been behind welfare 
retrenchment (McManus, 2018; Picot & Tassinari, 2017).  
 
Yet, partisanship does not only vary across governments but also within governments. One of 
the effects of the Great Recession, and of major economic crises in general, is the appointments 
of experts, both partisan and non-partisan, to crucial economic posts in cabinet. Since the start 
of the Great Recession in Western Europe, the number of non-elected, expert ministers, also 
known as technocrats, has more than doubled, particularly in political systems with more 
personalistic electoral systems (Alexiadou & Gunaydin 2019). Even though there has been 
considerable academic and popular debate regarding the role of non-elected technocrats in 
democracies (Berman, 2017; Bickerton & Accetti, 2017; Caramani, 2017), there is very little 
empirical evidence on the policy effects of technocrats, as opposed to partisan experts.   
 
Typically, technocrats are appointed during economic and financial crises to increase the 
government’s credibility vis-à-vis the markets (Schneider, 1998). Importantly, these 
technocrats are not just experts who will implement the government’s agenda. They are trained 
economists who believe in market-conforming reforms that increase economic efficiency 
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(Dargent, 2015; Kaplan, 2017). In Latin America, technocrats appointed to top ministerial 
positions have been found to have important policy effects, above and beyond the policy 
preferences of the presidents who appointed them (Dargent, 2015; Kaplan, 2014). As such, it 
has been argued that recurrent economic crises and technocratic appointments have weakened 
the political systems in Latin America, and could potentially destabilize party competition in 
Europe (Roberts, 2017). Nonetheless, whether technocrats deliver more neo-liberal reforms 
than partisan politicians in Europe is still to be determined (Alexiadou, 2020).  
 
Here I investigate the policy effects of technocrats and expert partisans, accounting for 
monetary and financial crises in 13 European parliamentary democracies. While, there is 
empirical evidence that ministerial appointments can, under certain conditions, affect policy 
outcomes (Chwieroth, 2007b; Wenzelburger & Staff, 2017), the policy impact of technocrats 
in European political systems is understudied with a few notable exceptions (Alexiadou, 2020; 
Bertsou & Caramani, 2020). To advance our understanding of the policy impact of technocratic 
appointments as opposed to the policy effects of economic crises, I utilize two-stage least 
square models and a new dataset on ministers’ professional and political background by 
Alexiadou (2020).  
 
This paper is one of the first to test the policy effects of major economic crises both directly 
and indirectly through the appointments of technocrats and partisan expert finance ministers. 
As such this work contributes both to the extensive literature on the social effects of economic 
crises (Armingeon et al., 2016; Kersbergen et al., 2014) as well as to the growing literature on 
the policy effects of individual politicians (Alexiadou, 2020; Chwieroth, 2007a; Dargent, 2015; 
Jochimsen & Thomasius, 2014; Kaplan, 2017).  
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Economic Crises & market-conforming social welfare policies  
During major economic shocks governments are forced to respond either with fiscal stimulus 
or with radical budget cuts (Armingeon, 2012). Governments’ initial responses to international 
crises, such as the 2008 financial crisis are typically expansionary. Governments need to make 
sure that there is sufficient credit in the economy to contain further spill-over effects that 
negatively affect growth and employment (Armingeon, 2012). Yet, often, expansionary 
budgets are replaced with radical budget cuts to address the rising public debt and deficit, which 
in turn, negatively affects the country’s credibility in the international markets. Austerity does 
not only hurt governments because they cannot deliver on their pre-electoral promises but it 
typically drains resources from social services such as education, pensions and social 
assistance, that are popular with voters (Armingeon, 2012; Pierson, 1996).  
 
In responding to major economic shocks, governments vary significantly both in their policy 
as well as in their political strategies. In terms of the specific policy reforms, these can vary 
significantly by government despite commonalities in the economic shock. Governments can 
choose to raise taxes or cut spending. If budget reductions are chosen, they will typically target 
the departments of social welfare as they account for a very large percentage of the 
government’s spending. Yet, even within the social welfare department, governments need to 
choose if they will reduce benefits from and services to more vulnerable populations, such as 
the unemployed or single parents, against services that constitute social investment, such as 
health and education, or public pensions, that are often seen as deferred income. Naturally, the 
latter are electorally more salient and particularly costly.  
 
In terms of their political strategies, governments can time their severest budget cuts early in 
their term in the hope that the economy improves nearer to elections (Hübscher & Sattler, 
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2017), or move forward to more radical budget cuts when they have formed broad and 
consensus coalitions to diffuse responsibility and reduce the expected electoral costs 
(Armingeon et al., 2016). Nonetheless, often governments, particularly of the center-right, 
simply use instances of economic crises to push forward market-conforming policies they 
favored all-along, as was the case in Spain under  Rajoy’s government (Picot & Tassinari, 
2017) or the UK under Cameron (McManus, 2018).  
  
An alternative strategy that I investigate here is appointing technocrats to the portfolio of 
finance as a way of delegating policy to political outsiders. In what follows I define technocrats 
and technopols, before deriving hypotheses regarding the potential effects on social welfare 
policy. 
 
Defining Technocrats and Technopols  
Following Bertsou and Caramani (2020), McDonnel and Valbrzzii (2014), and Alexiadou 
(2020), I refer to technocrats, as the non-elected experts who hold cabinet positions. 
Technocrats are different from politicians who have expertise in a particular field, for example, 
politicians with prior professional experience in economics. Here, I will refer to partisan 
experts as technopols. In addition, I do not assume that when techncorats take-on political roles, 
i.e accept a ministerial post in the cabinet, they become ‘technopols’(J Williamson, 1994). 
Instead I maintain that although political appointments provide opportunity for policy 
influence, technocrats lack what true technopols enjoy; the control of important political 
resources such as political experienced and influence within a political organization (Joignant, 
2011).  
As extensively discussed in the literature (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020), it is important to 
distinguish technocrats from technopols when predicting their policy impact. A finance 
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minister who is a partisan expert (i.e. elected to parliament) is qualitatively different from a 
non-partisan expert (i.e a non-elected expert brought into the cabinet from an outside 
profession). Holding expertise constant, technocrats differ in the level of their commitment to 
policy reform when reform can potentially have personal political cost. However, even if 
elected politicians fully discount the political costs of their policy choices (i.e. they are 
ideologues), they might still feel committed to their electoral promises and their constituencies 
(Grossman, 2014). In contrast, technocrats are likely to commit to a reform as long as it is 
considered optimal by their professional peers and enhances their professional reputation 
(Alesina & Tabellini, 2007).  
 
I primarily look at technocrat finance ministers to study the effects of technocrats on the welfare 
state during crises for two reasons. Prime ministers are twice as likely to appoint technocrats 
and technopols to the finance portfolio during major economic crises than during quieter times 
(Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019.; Hallerberg & Wehner, Forthcoming). Second, finance 
ministers are the second most powerful actors in parliamentary cabinets after the prime 
minister, with important agenda and veto powers over the government’s spending priorities 
(Alexiadou, 2020; Hallerberg, Strauch, & Hagen, 2009; Jochimsen & Thomasius, 2014). They 
often enjoy the prime minister’s support, but this is not necessary. Finance ministers are so 
visible to markets and voters that sometimes their priorities clash with the priorities of other 
colleagues around the cabinet table. This is not the case with most other cabinet ministers.  
 
Consequently, when trying to understand the policy effects of economic crises, it makes sense 
to study the role of finance ministers who are explicitly appointed in order to contain public 
spending. In addition, finance ministers have a very specific and relatively narrow set of 
technical skills, which is mostly concentrated in the field of economics. Using data by 
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Alexiadou (2020; 2019), Figure 1 shows the professional background of finance ministers in 
18 parliamentary democracies, and of technocrat finance ministers. While in all of the countries 
in our sample the majority of finance ministers have a background in economics or finance, 
just 10 percent of all finance ministers have been technocrats, while twice as many have been 
experienced ministers with policy expertise.  
 
Figure 1: Professional Background of Finance & Employment Ministers 
 
 
 
Left-Right Ideology, Government Spending and Technocrats  
Finance ministers oversee the drafting the government’s budget. There is a consensus in the 
literature that economists appointed to the finance portfolio tend to hold market conforming 
preferences, particularly when they are appointed during economic crises (Dargent, 2015; 
Kaplan, 2017). Market-conforming policies include the “deregulation of product markets, labor 
markets, and financial markets; the liberalization of trade; the corporatization of state entities; 
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and low-rate, broad-base tax reform” (Christensen, 2017). By limiting the role of the 
government, market-conforming policies aim at allocating resources more efficiently 
(Christensen, 2017).  
 
Technocrats and technopols were instrumental in liberalizing the economies of Latin American 
countries in the eighties and nineties by adopting market conforming policies, also known as 
the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Kaplan, 2014, 2017; John Williamson, 1993). In Europe, 
technocratic presence has been a lot more limited particularly during the eighties. However, a 
significant number of Northern European countries in Continental Europe were already 
enjoying high levels of monetary stability, partly due to influential independent central banks 
and corporatist bargains between employers and unions (Alexiadou, 2012; Crouch, 1993; Hall, 
2013; Mares, 2006). Furthermore, the budget-correcting austerity policies of the eighties and 
the early nineties did not seriously threaten the mature European welfare states (Gingrich, 
2015; Korpi & Palme, 2003; Scruggs, 2006).  
 
Nonetheless, important reforms took place with the aim of liberalizing the labor markets, and 
reducing the generosity of welfare payments (Christensen, 2017; Gingrich, 2015). The policy 
prescriptions coming out of think-tanks, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), attributed slow economic growth to generous welfare payments 
that created ‘poverty traps’ and to barriers in business restructuring due to employment 
protection legislation, i.e. legislation that makes it hard to employers to dismiss their workforce 
(OECD, 1996). Specifically, according to the OECD (OECD, 1996, p. 38) while activation 
policies such as re-training and employment subsidies (Active Labour Market Policies, or 
ALMPs) encourage employability, generous and long-lasting unemployment benefits hinder 
the reduction of structural employment and reduce labor market efficiency.  
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The prescriptions to cut welfare payments have been controversial for social-democratic parties 
and their leaders. Many of the market-conforming economic and labour market reforms 
demanded by the international markets and think-tanks, such as the OECD, go against 
traditional social-democratic principles, and more importantly, against the interests of trade-
unions and the core voters of social democratic parties (Rueda, 2007). Despite, the ongoing 
debate in the literature regarding the policy priorities of Social Democratic parties in the post 
WWII era (Clark 2002, Hibbs, 1977, 1987, Pierson, 1996, Garret, 1998, Hicks, 1999, Korpi 
and Palme, 2003, Bradley et al, 2003, Boix 1998, Rueda 2005, Green-Pedersen 2001 among 
others), the primary policy objectives of social democracy have historically been equality and 
labor de-commodification (Boix 1998, Iversen and Wren 1998, Esping-Andersen 1990). Right 
of center-parties, on the other hand, have been more forthcoming in adopting market-
conforming labor market policies since they generally prescribe to freer markets and smaller 
welfare states (Allan & Scruggs, 2004; Korpi & Palme, 2003; Rueda, 2007).  
 
Where do the technocrats stand in relation to market conforming policies? As with partisan 
politicians, I expect technocrats’ policy preferences to largely vary with their professional 
career. A labor economist is less likely to support deregulated labor markets than an economist 
who works in the financial sector. After all even central bankers who have a rather straight-
forward policy mandate vary in the intensity of their preferences (Adolph, 2013; Ainsley, 
2017). Nonetheless, it is probably uncontroversial to assume that a technocrat finance minister, 
one whose background is primarily academic, aligns with think tanks such as the OECD in her 
social welfare preferences. If so, a technocrat finance minister would be to the right of the 
majority of social democratic parties, but probably to the left of right-of-center parties. In other 
words, I do not expect technocrats to be more ideological than the average right of center 
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politician. However, I expect them to be more willing to push through with reforms that are 
cost-saving and unpopular within the electorate. Accordingly, I expect technocrats to be 
associated with cuts in government and social welfare spending, and particularly with social 
spending that has a high budgetary impact and is popular among the electorate. 
 
Economic Crises and the appointments of technocrats  
According to the literature, technocrats, particularly in highly politicized and important posts 
such as the department of finance, are appointed for two main reasons during economic crises; 
to signal to investors and voters that an investment friendly environment exists (Schneider, 
1998) and to shield partisan heavyweights from the personal political costs of unpopular 
policies (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019). Alexiadou and Gunaydin (2019) find that although 
both monetary and financial crises predict the appointments of technocrats, they are more likely 
to be appointed in political systems where voters have a preferential vote,.i.e in more 
personalized electoral systems. Indeed, in these systems, the likelihood of appointing 
experienced politicians decreased significantly during the Great Recession, indicating that 
experienced politicians would rather not take a job that could ‘burn’ them. In turn, these 
findings suggest that technocrats might be more effective in undertaking market-conforming 
reforms than experienced partisans, especially when these are unpopular among the electorate. 
Building on and Alesina (2007), who argued that non-elected, non-partisan cabinet ministers 
are only marginally concerned about the political implications of their tasks, as they expect to 
return to their original professions when they leave government, one would expect technocrats 
to be more likely to push forward unpopular policy reforms than partisan ministers. 
 
Accordingly, I expect financial crises to have both direct and indirect effects on social 
spending. During financial crises, governments initially respond with increased social spending 
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but in the longer-run social spending will decrease. This is the direct effect. At the same time, 
during financial crises some governments resort to appointing technocrats, either to signal to 
the markets their market-conforming intentions and/or to address agency loss issues within 
their government. Either way, these technocrats are likely to push forward unpopular, market-
conforming policies. This is the indirect effect of financial crises on the welfare state. The 
argument is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Direct and indirect effects of financial crises on the welfare state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial  
Crisis 
Technocrats 
Investors/Markets 
Welfare State 
Cuts 
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Empirical Analysis 
Empirical model  
 
The central argument of this article is that financial crises have both direct and indirect effects; 
they have direct effects through budgetary pressures and indirect effects through the 
appointments of technocrats. To empirically model this process, I use a maximum likelihood, 
treatment effects model which is a two-stage least squares estimator. In the first stage, the 
estimator predicts the appointments of technocrats and the in second stage the estimator 
predicts predicts the policy impact of technocrats, taking into account the selection process.  
 
More specifically the treatment effects model estimates the two following equations:  𝑦"# = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝛽 + 𝑤"#𝛿 + 𝜀"#	, the regression equation (1)  𝑤"#∗ = 𝑧"#𝛾 + 𝑢"# , the selection equation (2) 
 
Since I expect financial crises to have both direct and indirect effects, crises are included in 
both the selection and the regression equations. Moreover, other exogenous variables are 
included in the selection equation , such as changes in government bond yield and the electoral 
system, that predict the appointments of technocrats and which need have a direct effect on y, 
the outcome variable of the regression equation. I discuss the data in more detail in the next 
section. 
 
Finally, the regression equation is an error correction model. There are two reasons for that: 
First, in line with the literature, I expect financial crises to have different short-term and long-
term effects on social spending; in the short term, spending should increase, while in the long-
term, spending should decrease. The panel, time-series data allow me to directly model these 
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dynamics using an error correction model, which, following Pesaran (2015) can be expressed 
as follows:  ∆𝑦"# = 𝛽3∆𝒙𝒊𝒕 − (1 − 𝜆)(𝑦"#9: − (𝛽3 + 𝛽:	)/(1 − 𝜆)𝒙𝒊𝒕9𝟏) + 𝜀"#,    (3) 
where the term (𝛽3 + 𝛽:	)/(1 − 𝜆) is the slope coefficient in the long-run relationship between 
x and y, while 𝛽3 is the short-run effect of a unit change in x on y.  
 
To sum up, in the regression model the dependent variable is in changes and all the regressors 
are in both changes and lagged by one year. In the selection model, which is a probit model, 
all variables, both the regressors and the dependent variable are lagged by one year to match 
the dynamic specification of the regression model. Robust standard errors are included.  
 
Data 
 
The data are unbalanced time-series/cross-section and include 13 countries and on average 
about 16 years of observations. The countries in the study are all Western European 
parliamentary democracies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden (Alexiadou, 2020; Alexiadou & 
Gunaydin, 2019).3 The data spans from 1990 to 2013 due to data availability primarily on bond 
yield data, but also because technocratic appointments have been more frequent during the last 
three decades, as austerity policies and structural reforms became more pressing. 
 
                                               
3 For summary statistics see Appendix 
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Three different dependent variables are used: total government spending as % of GDP, total 
social spending as % of GDP and total public health spending as % of GDP. These data are 
provided by the OECD and extracted by the Quality of Government Dataset (2010). 
 
I expect social spending to be one of the first policies to be negatively affected during periods 
of fiscal retrenchment, since it burdens public finances more than any other public expenditure. 
On average, social spending accounts for 15 to 20 percent of the GDP in advanced democracies 
in the last thirty years (OECD, 2016). The reason for including three different indicators of 
spending is that I expect technocrats to have more policy impact on spending cuts that are less 
popular, such as spending on health, than on total social spending. Government spending is 
included as a way to test if technocrats are more broadly with austerity policies.  
In the regression model I include the following controls, in both changes and levels: economic 
growth, the unemployment rate (Armingeon, Weisstanner, Engler, Potolidis, & Gerber, 2012)  
the Prime Minister, as measured by the Comparative Manifesto Project (RILE). 
 
There are two main explanatory variables: financial crises and technocrat finance ministers. I 
use two indicators for economic crises: one for Monetary Crisis, coded as 1 during inflation 
and currency crises (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009),  and an indictor variable for the Great 
Recession, coded as 1 since 2009 and 0 otherwise. Both of these indicators, monetary and the 
great recession, have also been found to strongly predict the appointments of technocrat finance 
ministers (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019). Therefore, they are included both in the regression 
and in the selection models. In fact, these two variables that capture economic crises are the 
two main predictors for the appointments of technocrats in the selection models. 
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Apart from monetary crises and the great recession, I also include the lagged change in the 10-
year bond yield of sovereign countries (own coding). Bond yields can change dramatically 
during financial crises especially when domestic economic and political conditions worsen 
dramatically. As such, technocrats could be appointed by prime ministers to signal to markets 
their commitment to policy reform as argued in the literature. Finally, I include a variable for 
how person-centred the electoral system is, to control for domestic institutional factors that 
condition the appointments of technocrats and high-ranking ministers to top economic posts in 
the cabinet (Alexiadou & Gunaydin 2019).  
 
The dependent variable in the selection model is whether the finance minister is a technocrat, 
coded as one who has never been elected at the national, regional or local levels and has a 
background in economics, banking and finance. In addition, I test the policy effects of 
technopols, ministers who have the same policy expertise as technocrats but have experience 
in government, specifically, they have served as cabinet ministers for at least 4 years. 
Technopols are also more likely to be appointed during financial crises (Alexiadou & Gunaydin 
2019). By testing the policy effects of technopols, one can further investigate the policy effects 
of ministerial appointments vis-à-vis the direct effects of financial crises. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 supports the expectation that both the 2009 financial crisis and technocrats have short 
and long-run effects on the welfare state and on government spending in general. Even though 
government spending as a percent of GDP typically increases, the 2009 financial crisis has had 
a profound long-run effect on both types of spending. Specifically, according to Column 1 of 
Table 1, in the long-run, social spending has gone down by at least 5 percent due to the 2009 
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financial crisis, which health spending decreased by about half of total social spending. In 
contrast, the 2009 financial crisis has had no long-run impact on total government spending. In 
all instances, the immediate effect of the 2009 crisis on welfare spending was a significant 
increase of the magnitude of about 1 percent for social and total spending and half percent for 
health spending. Monetary crisis, on the other hand, have had no effect, whether positive or 
negative, on spending according to Table 1. 
 
Technocrats, as predicted, also have a negative effect on social spending but primarily in the 
short-run; unlike the 2009 financial crisis, technocrats are associated with an immediate 
decrease in social spending by just under half a percentage point and a 0.12 percent cut in 
health spending. However, the long-run effect is the most interesting one. Here we find that 
technocrats have the same negative, long run effect on social spending as the 2009 financial 
crisis, although the indicator fails to reach statistical significance in the case of health spending. 
This is an important finding to the extent that it shows that financial crises have both direct 
and, perhaps unintended indirect effects on social spending, through the increase in the 
appointments of technocrats. Looking at the selection model, we can clearly see that both 
monetary and the 2009 financial crisis strongly predict the appointments of technocrats. In 
addition, a positive change in the bond yield, meaning higher borrowing costs for countries, 
also strongly predict the appointments of technocrats. Technopols, on the other hand, have a 
limited effect on social spending and no effect on health and government spending. According 
to Equation 2 of Table 2, appointing a technopols have no short-run effects but has a significant 
negative long-run effect of the magnitude of 16 percent. However, despite this significant 
effect, technopols have no independent impact on either health spending or government 
spending. This finding does provide some support to the expectation technocrats are appointed 
to implement unpopular cuts politicians would rather avoid.    
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Table 1: Effects of technocrat and partisan expert finance ministers on pension generosity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
D_Social  Technocrats D_Health Technocrat D Gov Expend Technocrat  
Second Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage 
L. social exp. -0.0531*** 
     
 
(0.017) 
     
L. health Exp. 
  
-0.0503*** 
   
   
(0.019) 
   
L.gov. exp.  
    
-0.0896*** 
 
     
(0.018) 
 
D.growth -0.2211*** 
 
-0.0385** 
 
-0.3414*** 
 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.097) 
 
L.growth -0.2390*** 
 
-0.0355** 
 
-0.3503*** 
 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.111) 
 
D.unem. 0.0698 
 
-0.0360 
 
-0.0195 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.082) 
 
L.unemp. 0.0013 
 
-0.0122*** 
 
-0.0250 
 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.033) 
 
D.Rile -0.0044 
 
0.0007 
 
-0.0136* 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.008) 
 
L.Rile -0.0053* 
 
-0.0002 
 
-0.0150** 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.006) 
 
D.monetaryCrisis 0.1517 
 
0.0521 
 
-0.0505 
 
 
(0.194) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.320) 
 
L.monetaryCrisis 0.4034 0.6810* 0.0413 0.5503 -0.0116 0.6027  
(0.268) (0.388) (0.120) (0.403) (0.468) (0.394) 
D.financialCrisis 1.0169*** 
 
0.4801*** 
 
2.4268*** 
 
 
(0.276) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.561) 
 
L.financialCrisis -0.2935* 1.0136*** -0.1622** 0.9670*** -0.4132 0.9583***  
(0.152) (0.325) (0.075) (0.335) (0.254) (0.317) 
D.Technocrat -0.3728*** 
 
-0.1236** 
 
-0.2776 
 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.355) 
 
L.Technocrat -1.0900*** 
 
-0.1880 
 
-1.1925* 
 
 
(0.326) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.706) 
 
10 year Bonds 
 
0.4625** 
 
0.3708 
 
0.3657*   
(0.207) 
 
(0.237) 
 
(0.208) 
Person. System 
 
-0.0311 
 
-0.0391 
 
-0.0449   
(0.043) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.050) 
Constant 1.9496*** -1.4924*** 0.5999*** -1.4301*** 5.1990*** -1.3939***  
(0.514) (0.257) (0.159) (0.284) (0.960) (0.276)        
Observations 222 222 211 211 217 217      
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Table 2: Effects of technocrat and partisan expert finance ministers on unemployment benefits 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
D_Social  Experts&exp D_Health Experts&exp D Gov Expend Experts&exp  
Second Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage 
L. social exp. -0.0600*** 
     
 
(0.013) 
     
L. health Exp. 
 
-0.0560*** 
   
   
(0.019) 
   
L.socx_govexp 
   
-0.0854*** 
 
     
(0.018) 
 
D.growth -0.2227*** 
 
-0.0363** 
 
-0.3313*** 
 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.094) 
 
L.growth -0.2446*** 
 
-0.0342** 
 
-0.3398*** 
 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.117) 
 
D.unem. 0.0769 
 
-0.0374 
 
-0.0360 
 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.085) 
 
L.unemp. -0.0106 
 
-0.0126*** 
 
-0.0277 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.032) 
 
D.Rile -0.0016 
 
0.0011 
 
-0.0126 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.008) 
 
L.Rile -0.0036 
 
-0.0004 
 
-0.0162*** 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.006) 
 
D.monetaryCrisis 0.1476 
 
0.0452 
 
-0.0492 
 
 
(0.206) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.326) 
 
L.monetaryCrisis 0.4012 0.3403 0.0258 0.2185 -0.0756 0.3726*  
(0.273) (0.251) (0.110) (0.209) (0.439) (0.217) 
D.financialCrisis 0.9148*** 
 
0.4753*** 
 
2.5536*** 
 
 
(0.312) 
 
(0.128) 
 
(0.589) 
 
L.financialCrisis -0.3324** 0.4304 -0.1790*** 0.6838** -0.6067*** 0.5079  
(0.156) (0.331) (0.058) (0.315) (0.223) (0.330) 
D.Expert&exper -0.1464 
 
0.0118 
 
0.1344 
 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.292) 
 
L.Expert&exper -0.9733*** 
 
-0.0540 
 
0.0607 
 
 
(0.254) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.311) 
 
10 year Bonds 
 
0.1929 
 
0.0899 
 
0.1055   
(0.133) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.094) 
Person. System 0.0060*** 
 
0.0037** 
 
0.0042***   
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
Constant 2.3029*** -1.1595*** 0.6343*** -1.2380*** 4.9062*** -1.1819***  
(0.402) (0.215) (0.157) (0.243) (1.059) (0.238)        
Observations 222 222 211 211 217 217 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Discussion 
 
How do economic crises affect the welfare state? I try to address this important question by 
investigating both the direct effects of major economic shocks and their indirect effects, 
through the appointments of technocrats to the portfolio of finance.  
 
As expected, I find that the 2009 financial crisis has had a profound long-run effect on the 
welfare state but not on government spending. Moreover, the 2009 crisis had both a direct and 
indirect effect: since 2009 the appointments of experts to the portfolio of finance, whether non-
partisan or partisan increased significantly. These, the techncocrats and the technopols are 
associated with cuts in social spending, although only technocrats are also associated with cuts 
in health and government spending. These findings suggest two things: first, technocrats are 
more likely to undertake cuts in welfare benefits that are costly and political. Second, financial 
crises can have profound effects on the welfare state both due to budgetary pressures but also 
due to political appointments.  
 
These findings provide an initial evidence on the indirect effects of economic crises on the 
welfare state through ministerial appointments. Yet, these findings raise a question. If the party 
and voters do not really want the reforms (i.e. cuts in their healthcare), how can governments 
or ministers stay in office and implement the reforms? What are the underlying political and 
social factors that determine the tenure of technocrat ministers?  
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Online Appendix 
 
Table A1: Frequency of technocrats and partisan experts in the portfolios of finance and 
employment 
Country Fin. 
Techno 
Expert Expert & 
Experience 
Expert & 
High 
Rank 
Fin. 
Techno 
Expert Expert & 
Experience 
Expert 
& High 
Rank 
1970-2015 2008-2015 
Austria 0.02 0.82 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.71 0.14 0.57 
Belgium 0.09 0.53 0.38 0.09 0.43 0.43 0.14 0.00 
Denmark 0.00 0.47 0.29 0.16 0.00 0.43 0.29 0.43 
Finland 0.02 0.33 0.07 0.29 0.00 0.71 0.14 0.71 
France 0.18 0.44 0.07 0.11 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.00 
Germany 0.00 0.78 0.36 0.56 0.00 0.86 0.86 0.86 
Greece 0.10 0.69 0.16 0.00 0.43 1.00 0.29 0.00 
Italy 0.18 0.80 0.18 0.00 0.43 1.00 0.43 0.00 
Netherlands 0.00 0.71 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.29 
Norway 0.07 0.49 0.09 0.38 0.00 0.57 0.43 0.57 
Portugal 0.64 0.82 0.16 0.03 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.00 
Spain 0.00 0.82 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.29 0.00 
Sweden 0.18 0.60 0.18 0.07 0.86 0.86 0.00 0.00      
    
Total 0.11 0.64 0.21 0.17 0.26 0.67 0.25 0.26      
    
 
